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Effects of the Presence of Democracy in Hegemons on Hegemonic Intervention in a Unipolar System

Michael Sheflin '08

This paper outlines major theoretical elements of the effects of democracy and hegemony on intervention and peace. In particular, it examines the effect of the presence of democracy in hegemonic military and coercive intervention, and non-intervention. The presence of democracy in an intervening hegemon can have a significant and pronounced effect on policy-choices and success in advancing peaceful-resolution mechanisms and norms for dispute-resolution.

Over the past decade and a half, there has been significant progress toward consensus on hypotheses, and production of research and data relating to 'The Democratic Peace.' The initial simplistic and untrue contention that democracies do not go to war led to the rejection of such a Monadic Hypothesis, and its subsequent reformation and acceptance in the form of the Dyadic Hypothesis. Consensus regarding the Dyadic Hypothesis,¹ that the presence of democracy in two states will reduce the likelihood of conflict, has led to new research on previously tangential issues of research and meta-theory. Some issues are still contested and controversial whereas others may be straightforward and marginal, but significant hypotheses have resulted from what initially started as merely an endorsement of Democratic Pacifism. The end of the Cold War has produced a shift from systemic bipolarity to hegemony. This massive shift occurred on a systemic level, but states have also sought hegemony regionally. The growing importance of the

phenomena of hegemonic bids, and our increasing wealth of information about cases and states leads to the inevitable questions of how democracy may affect hegemony. Because humanitarian *interventions* are becoming more numerous and expansive, multilaterally and unilaterally, the effect of democracy on hegemonic action is acutely important as manifested in terms of its effect on hegemonic intervention. What have been the effects of the level of democracy present in a hegemon on hegemonic intervention: how does democracy affect intervention, effectiveness (*en bello*), and peace resolution?

I. Democracy, Hegemony, and Intervention

In the post-Cold War period, the United Nations has been able to take an unprecedented role in mandating or not mandating peacekeeping. A major source of optimism for American UN analysts and observers was that the collapse of the Soviet Union would reverse the USSR-USA deadlock over the Security Council veto capability. Hegemonic aspirations on the regional level have created a state interest in using military intervention as a

¹ The likelihood of two democratic states going to war is inversely proportional to the level of democracy in each member of a dyad.

springboard for broader leadership bids, and also to demonstrate hegemonic **capacity**. Hegemonic intervention involves hegemonic bids for leadership (Adebajo 64) and not merely participation. Therefore, the **hegemon** in a given situation is the state who spearheads a bid, rather than that with the greatest capacity and capacity to project. It is very unlikely that a situation will arise in which multiple hegemons spearhead missions, as any other aspiring hegemon would generally be a supporting player.² However, as it may affect the outcome of peace, it is important to note whether there is confluence between the US and other hegemons.

Democratic Peace is concerned with the effects of democracy on international relations. As mentioned briefly, many studies have dealt with the effects of democracy on dyadic conflict. These hypotheses will be integrated within the following analysis. However, Democratic Peace research to date has ignored the effect of the level of democracy in a hegemon on peace. Analysis of the limited number of cases of hegemonic interventions in disputes since the Cold War yields insight into this matter, but more research – data sets and focus on

democracy's effect on hegemony and intervention – is required for a better understanding of what may become the most common democratic form of militarized conflict.

Because the timing of intervention can alter the effectiveness of intervention, it is important to establish several things. Preceding intervention, is there an identifiable conflict between groups? Such a conflict need not be military, but rather a distinct and identifiable dispute between discernible actors. There has been a growing propensity to include intra-state conflict as a potential threat to international peace, and thus domestic strife and humanitarianism have led to interventions. The other important component is the end of conflict. The way this paper will measure peace is relatively simplistic but goes beyond traditional notions of state-centered peace resolution. A conflict is resolved if all relevant parties have dropped the relevant disputed claims and have **explicitly recognized the status quo as tenable**. In some sense this is a tough standard, but can include a variety of configurations and scenarios for peace settlement. Additionally, this definition takes into account the fact that traditional inter-state peace resolution may not actually contribute to peace. The inclusion of non-state actors' interests and disputes is integral and highly relevant. Though states have generally dominated "organized violence," there is a growing recognition that "non-state actors, whether domestic or transnational, have important, even decisive, effects on the frequency and/or manner in which states engage in organized violence" (Wendt 9).

² The multilateral framework necessary for a truly joint bid, especially for as sensitive a subject as intervention, has not existed and is unlikely to manifest itself in the near future. This may become increasingly problematic moving into multilateral intervention or regional blocs such as AU, UN, and EU intervention. One answer is that such multilateral interventions are not hegemonic, but this is not sufficient to deal with hegemonic participation within a multilateral framework. Such a theoretical problem mandates greater enquiry, especially since states which accept democratic norms are more likely to participate in such a framework.

However, judging conflict's end in this manner also means that evolving interests or dispute-claims complicate the situation. Greater consensus in standards will be required because of the difficulty in achieving or even creating a universal standard spanning a variety of disparate units and actors. Thus the identification of the core of the dispute is utmost because rhetoric and policies often change (especially in democracies) over time. Additionally, non-state actors are subject to different constraints than states, so it is necessary to justify their inclusion within this model.

II. Methodological and Epistemological Issues:

Non-state actors complicate recognition of the status quo because of their exclusion, generally, from direct sovereignty, and often (as with Hizballah) because their creation stems from unpopular state policies and gaps in sovereignty. They, therefore may not be prone to recognize the status quo, and are not constrained by the same norms as state actors in a state-oriented international system. This may illustrate that a systemic effect of democracy is the inability of states in general to impose unfavorable and unpopular status-quos indiscriminate of powerful domestic lobbies. In addition to realists, Liberals and neo-conservatives also recognize the immense importance of dealing with non-state actors that pose threats to peace either implicitly or sometimes through militarily confrontation. In the post-Cold War period, interventions have increasingly been directed at the alleviation of humanitarian conditions,

which does not always necessitate the use of military force.

Traditional Democratic Peace literature has tended to deal with states largely because most studies examine the effect of democracy on states.³ System-level effects have mostly dealt with norms, often through benchmarks like state norm-compliance. Therefore, that the literature does not deal expressly with non-state actors is neither surprising nor particularly problematic to methodology. It does, however, warrant significant renewed research efforts and new directions more generally. The argument here is not to test the amount of democracy present in disputants quantitatively per se. There are very few cases of democratic non-state actors in interventions. The present system of states leaves few opportunities for grand gaps in power or sovereignty that could allow for a viable hegemonic non-state actor.⁴ We will have accurate measures of the democracy and autocracy levels of any hegemonic actors and must therefore only justify that disputant non-state actors can be treated in a theoretically similar manner to disputant state actors. The roots of this argument are implicit in a good deal of prominent theory and policy-making. Just as Kegley and Hermann recognize a spectrum of political configurations across democracies and autocracies (Kegley and

³ Those that look beyond state aggregation look often at the effect on leaders (like Kegley and Herman) - but thus those leaders' subsequent effects on state policy.

⁴ Hamas and the former Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia may be counted as non-state actors that upon achieving degrees of sovereignty were unable to incorporate into the international status quo.

Hermann 520), so such spectra may occur in non-state actors (and organizations). These organizations have their own leaders, beliefs, interests, platforms, and in some cases degrees of de facto sovereignty.

Another methodological stumbling block is how to deal with the systemic hegemon – the United States – versus regional hegemons. Confluence between the two levels of hegemony is not hugely difficult to deal with, but what effect does democracy have on this confluence? This creates two distinct problems. The first is how to deal with regional-systemic discord regarding intervention, and how potential confluence/conflict affects peace. The second is whether the presence of democracy in the hegemon has an effect on such confluence. Because the systemic hegemon is democratic as a constant, there is reason to believe that the level of democracy at the regional level of hegemony is not as important as other factors. In part this reflects the normative argument that systemic hegemony helps create and promote norms other states are more willing to follow. **XXX Also the problem of what the state system structure is and whether there is hegemony. Issue of Pfaff's criticism.**

The level of economic development present in disputants may also make a

III. Core Hypotheses and Theoretical Claims:

Before corroborating theory with cases, it is necessary to outline some underlying

significant difference in peace, especially post-conflict. In general, as economic development increases, post-conflict settlement and rebuilding will also be smoother. This may additionally mean that intervention in well-developed economies may tend to produce a more pacific outcome than intervention in less-developed economies over the long-term. Economic development may also temper aggression within dyads, as domestic interests become more entrenched and complex (Dixon and Senese 565).

As with the definition of wars in the Democratic Peace Research Project, there is some question about what is meant by “intervention” rather than more normalized “involvement.” This paper adopts the view that there are two forms of intervention, in addition to non-intervention. The first form – military intervention – involves a third-party directing military force against one or more parties in a pre-existing dispute. The second form – coercive intervention – involves soft-power means such as sanctions, inspections, and third-party peace negotiations, but not the deployment of military force. Finally, as the presence of democracy in disputant states tends to abate violence, the dyadic presence of democracy must also be taken into account, and has been dealt with sufficiently in traditional Democratic Peace literature.

theoretical elements integral to the analysis of democratic hegemony.¹

¹ Democratic hegemony refers to a hegemonic state in whose governance there are extant elements of democracy – i.e. hegemons that are democratic.

Hegemony:

The effects of hegemony themselves may have an effect on peace, so cases will examine both democratic and non-democratic hegemons to isolate the effects of democracy in particular. This issue is complicated by the fact that in the period being study hegemony has continually existed on the systemic level, even in the absence of regional hegemonic arrangements. There may be legitimacy to the argument that the level on which hegemony exists affects the outcome. Just as geographical proximity plays a role in defining capacity and capabilities for intervention-decisions, the outcome may also be affected by the level and particular factors of a hegemonic arrangement.

Hegemony may also strongly encourage certain norms, especially during intervention. Similarly, the interests of members of a dyad may be subverted in favor of those of the hegemon. This can lead to ignoring problems or destroying the capability of the dyadic state, breeding dependency on the hegemon (Morales 6). This can affect the outcome by, in the case of the former, producing incomplete settlements and lengthening conflict. Large-scale destruction of capabilities can also increase the duration of conflict and intervention, often also encouraging nationalism and violent resistance, imminently apparent from the Iraq and Lebanon invasions.

Democratic Hegemony

The effects of hegemony, normatively and systemically, are not the effects of democracy on hegemony specifically. Democratic hegemony ideally reinforces dispute-resolution mechanisms and

encourages the “*democratic norm of bounded competition*” (Dixon and Senese 548). The encouragement of democratic norms even on one side of the dyad can alter the conditions of conflict on state and individual levels. Much of this relies on policy and not merely rhetoric, and since the Iraq War global perception may have shifted away from close-cooperation with the United States. Ironically, because neo-conservatives generally believe dictators do not negotiate in good faith, they have created a situation in which the US is forced to subvert or deprioritize its own stated international norms and agreements. Normatively and materially there are limits to unilateralism,² and autocratic states may therefore be more likely to cite double standards and not conform to norms when confronted with heavy-handed unilateral hegemony. The differing accounts of the US 2003 invasion of Iraq provide a very good example of this. Whereas, US leaders and citizens were generally believed Iraqis would welcome freedom and renounce what they saw as tyranny. Conversely, the attempt to impose a foreign political system has become increasingly unpopular in Iraq. Undoubtedly, the perception of political imposition has aided anti-American sentiment. The initially limited Ethiopian invasion has followed a similar course. Although its original intent was to bolster the Somali Provisional Government, intervention is now largely perceived as a crusade; with religious imperialism an increasingly powerful view. The insurrections and lengthening interventions in both cases have helped

² Unilateralism may be seen to breach various norms and therefore weaken their ability to influence.

challenge the infinite nature of hegemonic power.

Parity in power does not take into account the importance of ideas and nationalism particularly. Citizens of the hegemonic nation have access to similar or greater information in the present system and are not immune to such argumentation. Because of the structure of most of the spectrum of democratic governments, it is more difficult for democratic hegemons to sustain interventions. Peace-settlements may also be more prone to sub-state hegemonic interests, which tend to be disparate and divergent as a result of economic liberalism, the presence of civil society, and democracy's effects on societies.

States that accept hegemonic leadership bids must also perceive it as broadly or narrowly in their interest to do so. Alternatively, leaders of those states accepting hegemonic bids must broadly perceive it in their interests of survival or political or material gain – if it is not perceived to be in the state's interest. Systemically it has been argued that as the number of democracies increases, non-democratic states are more willing to accept democratic norms of conflict resolution (Mitchell 755). Publics and leaders are more likely to see similar governmental configurations as a “like unit” (Kegley and Hermann 518). Much like ethnocentricity in psychology, leaders are more likely to see greater similarity between their own state and a state with a purportedly similar political configuration. It follows, therefore, that non-democratic states are more likely to accept hegemonic authority if they are

likely to accept democratic norms.³ Without implying causation, states that are likely to accept democratic hegemonic leadership are likely to accept democratic norms. This provides an opportunity for the expansion of bounded competition, assisting speedier and more comprehensive resolution of disputes. However, the acceptance of democratic hegemony does not mean that hegemonic interests become democratic. Conflicts may be ignored or prolonged, and intervention producing a settlement may not always tend toward the democratic norms in question. Additionally, the War on Terror provides an acute example of state conformity to non-democratic norms. The US has been increasingly willing to overlook foreign military deployment, in situations that would normally mandate internal policing, to counter terrorism. This distracts from those states' non-compliance with democratic norms in favor of the broader hegemonic agenda prioritized at that time. The following case studies serve to elucidate the confluence of the theoretical effect of democracy on hegemony in the harsh realities facing bids and prosecution of hegemonic leadership and hegemonic intervention.

IV. Case Analyses:

This argument requires an inclusive look at the spectrum of policy options available to hegemonic actors, to gauge the effect of the presence of democracy in hegemons on peace. They are laid out as follows: military intervention, non-military intervention, and non-

³ Or are more likely to accept democratic norms in hegemony/Especially likely to accept hegemonic norms if they accept hegemonic leadership.

intervention. Although their centrality is not as great, the effects of democracy on non-intervention yield important insight.

Military Intervention:

Military intervention refers specifically to the deployment of military force; so it does not necessarily include the same benchmarks theoretically attributed to “war.” Some democratic military interventions, as in Somalia and Iraq, provide evidence of prolonged conflict due to unclear or expanding goals. Issues with efficiency are more likely to affect policy and thus outcomes in governments with democratic participation. That is, poor military execution is likely to end or delay the careers of various politicians involved in the war, making democracies more likely to terminate or alter interventions. Even if key leaders do retain their job, alteration of policies is a necessary determinant of their political survival. This may occur regardless of the progress of the intervention, and can alter or disrupt the goals or execution, and will be examined in greater depth when looking at psychology.

The normative argument would suggest a greater propensity for democratic norms of *jus ad bellum* and *jus en bello* by democracies than in non-democracies. The argument follows that democracies, more likely to promote human rights and justice in and for war domestically, are more likely to include those norms in foreign policies (Dixon and Senese 549; and Kegley and Herman 512). At times, therefore, such policies are more likely to support status quo norms and moderate aggressive policy. At other times, it may make democratic leaders less attentive to international norms that conflict with the

human rights based view of international politics. The alternative explanation is that democratic leaders are constrained by domestic institutions (Kegley and Hermann 514). Sovereignty norms and capability restrictions tend to constrain the universal application of such policies – but only if those norms and restrictions are perceived to be binding. Democracies that have binding institutions and norms domestically are more likely to replicate those perceptions and the resulting behavior in international policy.

Traditionally, one of societies’ key goals has been to reproduce the norms and categorizations essential to the functioning of those societies, or such societies would fail or die. Just as domestic models try to reproduce key norms, so the international system – even in anarchy – sometimes demands conformity to such norms. The norm of sovereignty, increasingly challenged by non-state actors, has also been challenged by some American policymakers. They may see American interests as relatively unaffected by norms. Even should such policymakers believe that they prioritize national interests above constraining norms and institutions, to a certain extent their perceptions and motivations are based on those norms or institutions, if only that the perceived interests are a reaction. Either way, the greater penchant for American leaders, in both Bush Jr. Administrations, to sideline traditional international norms that were seen as confluent with “American interests” means by some accounts that “the United States is not a status quo power” (Jervis 383). As the proportion of democracies in the system increases, non-democratic states are therefore more

likely to be receptive to democratic norms (Mitchell 755). Hegemony may strongly influence both levels of norm creation identified by Sara McLaughlin Mitchell: Norm Emergence and Norm Acceptance (Mitchell 751-753). Hegemons can help define the agenda of norms, and can thus do so with regard to its own interests. Additionally, they may grant perception of the international community's acceptance, thus promoting international acceptance in actuality. As with the War on Terror, the US has helped push a particular issue into international prominence.

Once norms become more universal states that do not accept the international order, and especially the norm of sovereignty, are more likely to be labeled "rogue states" (Wendt 286). This rule cannot be universalized, because it is very difficult, in some cases, to predict how similarly leaders will perceive other states to that over which they preside. In reality, governments with similar political configurations may harbor a great deal of enmity and perceive vast dissimilarities. Democracies have tended to perceive each other in this way and therefore exhibit, at least in theory, a greater degree of understanding and amity. No doubt, a complete disregard for norms is likely to upset the perception of "like units" between states. Non-state actors have an even more "tenuous standing" (Wendt 353). Since the "Axis of Evil" speech, there has been implicit US recognition of a greater polarization between rogue and status quo states. There are cases, as with the US in Iraq and the War on Terror, in which democratic norms are ignored by democratic states, in particular democracies whose populations feel

threatened or are in conflict, in which leaders and not democratic publics are granted greater leadership (Kegley and Hermann 516). With most cases, however, potential "rogues" of international norms are autocratic states or organizations, normatively encouraging perceptions of "the other." In any case, the reduction of democratic norms compliance has a negative effect on prospects for peaceful settlement and peace more generally. Given this argument, actual compliance to democratic norms may not be as important as perception of compliance to democratic norms. Thus countries may call themselves democratic, or align with certain key international priorities, without an actual exhibition of democratic norms on the ground. Thus, Pakistan can call itself democratic and have elections, but can also allow extensive government and military meddling under the guise of the hegemonically-driven War on Terror.

The final corollary is the argument that the perception of hegemonic decline, and in particular cuts in defense spending, can lead to the reinterpretation of interests and the invention of crises and conflicts (Morales 14). Democracies are not necessarily more immune to media sensationalism, and some sociologists have sought to explain Israeli policy primarily as fear-based-responses (*Impact of The Lebanon War on Hamas and Kadima*). This may be true of the case of Iraq prior to invasion, in which the War was in part a result of the perception of the US's decline and the need to reassert military power, which may be a common result of hegemonic decline (Morales 14). Unable to assert the perception of safety

from terrorism, in light of economic recession, the US invented a crisis. This makes more sense with regard to the situation in border settlements and Kibbutzim in Israel prior to the Lebanon War in 2006. Very few people have been injured by rocket attacks, especially in comparison to the Israeli reprisal. However, the very presence of those rockets injures the general sense of security, despite the actual threat to safety, and contributes to the need for a grand positive action. As the conflict soured, continued efforts at military victory are framed as central to US interests as a result of hegemonic decline because of the initial Iraq conflict. Conceivably then, conflict resulting from a crisis of decline could reinforce perception of decline and reinforce crises. Conflict and crisis also tend to spur reallocations of power to leaders and away from the public, in democratic states, thus reducing the degree of democratic policymaking (Kegley and Hermann 516).

Democratic Military Intervention:

There has been a longstanding conflict over territorial and political sovereignty between Hizballah and Lebanon, in which Israel intervened in 2006 as a democratic regional hegemon with US support. Nigerian intervention in Liberia, represented a policy of aspiring (autocratic) regional hegemony assisted and legitimized by the United States.

In 1975, Israel began incursions into Lebanon to dislodge the PLO, ultimately leading to an occupation of Southern Lebanon between 1982 and 2000. The gap in Lebanese territorial control helped create Hizballah, which has evolved beyond merely an armed resistance group

into a Lebanese political and military player. Hizballah has periodically engaged in low-intensity conflict with Israel, and Israel has also periodically bombed Hizballah locations within Lebanon. This no doubt bred serious distrust between the Lebanese and Israeli publics and politicians, and contributed to Hizballah's popularity and growing domestic power in Lebanon. The present conflict began in July 2006, when Hizballah attacked a border post and captured Israeli soldiers. Israel retaliated not just against Hizballah but also against Lebanese targets such as the airport and major population centers.

The outcome has been inconclusive. Lebanon's government has deployed forces in territory bordering Israel that was almost exclusively controlled by Hizballah. However, Hizballah maintains a powerful military and political element in Lebanon, and Israel has at best managed to reinforce a poorly defined status quo or to legitimize the group they sought to destroy. Largely, this can be attributed to the unilateral nature of Israel's invasion and the unprecedented amount of support granted by the US to Israel. The US appeared to have complicit interests in destroying Hizballah as a terrorist group.

Conclusions for Democratic Military Intervention:

The unilateral nature of Israel's invasion meant that the interests of Israeli elites and policy makers are most relevant in explaining the intervention. Hizballah had launched missiles and infrequent attacks that created an environment of insecurity in Israel, weakening democratic norms in leaders and the population. Additionally, leaders needed to take

action in order to not alienate themselves from an increasingly frustrated public. Clearly sanctions in response to violent attacks would not do enough to salvage the political survival of Kadima and Ehud Olmert. The de-legitimization of Israeli norms for peaceful resolution have occurred over the course of a half-century, with a nation consistently under threat since its independence. Wars with Arab states and Palestinian groups have created a (hopefully declining) perception of “us versus them,” in which there was everybody but Israel and international Jewry. Additionally, Israeli and American policy makers were far more empathetic to Lebanon than Hizballah, as a terrorist non-state actor, and expressed a desire to unburden Lebanon of Hizballah.

The method of the intervention was not commensurate with this approach. Israel bombed major population centers, blockaded Lebanon, and destroyed a significant proportion of the country's infrastructure. Raids of hospitals clearly served no purpose in deterring or destroying Hizballah's capability to attack. Rather in a partial democracy with a very low level of democracy and democratic persistence, many people have increasingly opted to support Hizballah rather than the government. The Lebanese government also has a long legacy of the perception of democracy, and so its inaction in response to Israeli attacks may have been aided by a view of Israel as a like-state. This may also have created much of the confusion and shock over Israel's destruction of Lebanese targets. The historical animosity between the two states especially since 1982 has also hurt the perception by both states of like units.

Partly, there has been an unprecedented confluence of interests between the Israeli and American leadership since the election of Bush in 2000 and Sharon in 2001 (Rynhold, Steinberg 2004). Unlike his father, Bush has allowed Israel unprecedented latitude in terms of granting loans and not applying pressure in response to Israeli contravention of democratic norms and international law. This may be aided by the perception, especially after 9/11, that the Israeli **state** is bounded by **terrorist** states and organizations. The US actually resisted pressure to assist in any cease-fire efforts until August, and afterwards renewed Israeli military aid. The confluence of US hegemony was not enough to secure complete Israeli regional hegemony, however, because it employed unilateral action. This meant that the military failure weakened Israel's long-term policy of perceived military dominance and unquestioned hegemony. The failure of military victory resulting from the war, allowed a greater capacity for other states to attempt to assert influence (Bahgat). Influence was not asserted hegemonically or domineeringly (as a hegemonic bid) largely because of the almost universal recognition after Iraq (2003) and Lebanon (2006) that unilateral military action is unlikely to produce peace.

Detraction from US hegemonic support for Israel may not have a purely negative effect. Since the war, there has been significantly greater velocity for the Saudi Peace Plan, and Saudi Arabia has also had a greater role to play in the related Palestinian conflict. This may potentially benefit Israel, but Lebanon's political situation has deteriorated further lacking

consensus on the presidency. Hizballah has also become more recalcitrant in its rhetoric, seeing the capacity and the legitimacy of the Lebanese government in question. It has little to lose internationally, from an international community that considers it a terrorist organization. Domestically and regionally its hard-line has earned it increasing support as a viable Lebanese challenger to Israel.

Some spectators were encouraged by the deployment of Lebanese troops in the south after more than 20 years. Lebanon's political deadlock was no doubt created as a result of the war. In Israel, which is more democratic, however, the misconduct during the war, and its failure to achieve its goals, have put the viability of Kadima in question. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has come under increasing domestic pressure as several reports and investigations have been launched regarding the conduct and prosecution of the War. Clearly hegemonic unilateralism, especially in military intervention, is a risky endeavor. Leaders may end their careers if intervention fails, and thus in democracies are often inclined to attempt other policy options first. Israel is an odd case because its society and politics have suffered from years of crisis, which weaken domestic perception of the binding nature of democratic norms, as expected.

Autocratic Military Intervention: ECOMOG in Liberia

The case of Nigerian intervention in Liberia in particular helps further illuminate drawbacks of democratic hegemonic intervention, and the limits of broad labels for regime type not reflective

of the potential diversity of actual regime configurations.

In *In Search of Warlords*, Akeye Adebajo outlines the various domestic and international problems facing hegemonic interventions as they affect the Nigerian intervention in Liberia. Nigeria began sending peacekeeping troops under the umbrella of ECOMOG, a military adjunct of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in 1990. Though Nigeria was still a relatively poor country it had a historically continuous policy and rhetoric supporting the idea of Nigerian hegemony or even possibly empire (64). Warlords, most notably Charles Taylor, began leading reprisal attacks on peacekeepers in an attempt to end the mission (63). This subsequently led to increasing search and capture missions for the warlords or guerilla commanders that "compromised the neutrality of the missions and led to civilian deaths" (63). Therefore, mandates must be broad enough that intervening troops can contribute to actual peace keeping operations, but not too broad that they would be subject to accusations of misconduct.

'Pax Nigeriana,' expressed by a former Nigerian ambassador as "a Monroe Doctrine of sorts" (Adebajo 66) colluded with US interests⁴ resulting in strategic

⁴ The intervention actually involved US troops, although the intervention was largely spearheaded and commanded by Nigeria. The intervention is not considered an example of US hegemonic intervention but rather of US multilateral cooperation in league with Nigerian regional hegemony. Systemic effects of US hegemony and democracy may be examined, but without the

and tactical collusion especially regarding troop deployments (68). African states accepted Nigerian hegemony for two main reasons. Guinea and Sierra Leone had received hundreds of thousands of refugees whereas Ghana and Gambia feared domestic citizens' cooperation with rebel groups (69). Adebajo also says France wanted to prevent American predominance in its former sphere of influence whereas Germany wished to set a precedent for peacekeeping (69). Democracy appears not to have had a significant effect on acceptance of the hegemonic leadership bid, but aside from European states and the US, these states are not democratic.

It is important to note that whereas the deployment of troops may have been a very efficient multilateral arrangement, the problem was not recognized as trans-national exactly. Rather, Adebajo implies that the individual nature of states' interests in providing support and a particular layout for the intervention also contributed to disunity (Adebajo 69). Soon after the deployments began, the warlords began their reprisal campaigns to end intervention also exacerbating tensions between the peacekeeping donors. The Nigerian response was hard-line, and began a series of "obsessive" campaigns to kill Taylor (71). The objective became Taylor, and Nigeria was accused of indiscriminate heavy-handedness and even theft and smuggling (Adebajo 73).⁵ The governmental stance was a refusal to be intimidated or withdraw, but the

objective became Taylor (71). Such a hard-line was difficult to maintain and partly in response to Ghanaian pressure, tactics eventually moved away from military confrontation in favor of cooperation or bargaining (). The prolonged nature and unclear goals of the campaign led to public hostility, but there was no domestic option available for public recourse (Adebajo 72). This is corroborated by Nigeria's Polity IV democracy and autocracy rankings (See: Appendix A).

In addition to the stated and latent Nigerian political and military aims in maintaining preeminence, their policies of stability tie into a policy of general economic expansion and development through ECOWAS (Adebajo 72). Liberia's instability affected them not only directly materially, but also affected plans for economic expansion regionally and more generally. Following elections set up by Nigeria in 1997, Charles Taylor assumed the Liberian presidency until his exile in 2003 (80), continuing policies that injured and killed tens of thousands and led to another civil war and then international conflict. Ultimately, domestic parties resolved the dispute by ousting Taylor who fled to Nigeria and was ultimately extradited to the ICJ. During Taylor's rule, the conflict continued and Nigeria ultimately had to intervene a second time through ECOMOG, which by then had become a more institutionalized part of ECOWAS, to try to end the second Liberian War. Nigeria fell under significant pressure to reverse courses from direct confrontation with Taylor to conciliation.

expectation that the US was intervening as a hegemon.

⁵ Not dissimilar to accusations against the United States and to a certain extent Israel.

Because Liberia was considered a core interest, it was less likely to be responsive to military pressure. It is also probable, given Nigeria was still attempting to establish its legitimacy as a regional hegemon with military capacity to intervene, that failure was perceived as simply not an option by Nigeria's rulers. Because there was generally no direct link between popular will and governance, and the actual cost of Nigerian intervention is not transparent, there was also a greater likelihood of a long intervention from which Nigeria would not withdraw. Popular distaste for tactics or length or costs would not be reflected in policy as they would in a democratic state. Secondly, after the conclusion of intervention, there are already regional institutions in place to assist policies of economic development and bolster trade. Rather than breeding dependence on the hegemonic participant as would be expected especially in the case of autocratic interest-driven intervention, multilateral institutions to encourage regional trade and domestic development programs. Because stability did not return until the elections following Taylor's ouster, the majority of these effects remain to be seen although improvement does appear to have occurred.

Conclusions for Democratic Effects on Military Intervention:

Autocratic hegemony need not be completely menacing, but Nigeria's ultimate conciliatory stance toward Taylor most hurt the cause of peace. Deployment and command may have been partly multi-lateral, clearly at least initially favoring Nigerian interests. However, the negotiated settlement favored a particular member of the dyadic

conflict, as Taylor was perceived as the main player at the time. This illustrates the normative difficulties associated with transition from rebel group (non-state actor) to government (state actor). Taylor's rebel faction had no need to conform to international norms or obligations, and his presidential rule reflected this. Nigeria, facing civil strife and graft, was also accused of applying sanctions unequally during conflict (along with the US). The unilateral Nigerian nature of the peace not surprisingly led many of its weaker neighbors to fear Nigeria's "penchant for a unilateral diplomatic style that offends the sensibilities of smaller, poorer and weaker states" (Adebajo 77).

Adebajo correctly concludes that hegemony was necessary to spur and sustain the interventions in Liberia. But the hegemonic leadership bid occurred through a regional organization exhibiting bounded competition. Indeed, the initial 1990 intervention through ECOMOG helped institutionalize ECOWAS's role as a West African peacekeeping mechanism and institution, and Nigeria's hegemonic leadership. The most important effects of democratic hegemony are in the peace resolution following conflict. Nigeria initially intervened during the civil war, and its reputation suffered as a result of unilateral and heavy-handed actions during conflict. However, the ultimate nature of the peace-settlement was unilateral, with Nigeria playing a disproportionate role in elections, and resulting in "their newly found client" gaining power.

However, in peace resolution, democratic norms should apply more than in the crisis of conflict, unless the political resolution itself is a response to crisis. As things began to go poorly for Nigeria it is conceivable this had an effect on Nigeria's unilateral political resolution. However, Nigeria was present for the duration of the political solution, and returned to intervene in 2003. In conjunction with the claims that Nigerian leadership saw failure as unacceptable, the peace resolution may have been expedient rather than well-thought out. This is not altogether unexpected, but contrasts distinctly with democratic peace-resolution. The case of Israel displays murky traits of this conclusion, which is more obvious from Iraq. There is a significant argument to be made on either side that the political resolution, following official combat operations in Iraq, was unilaterally imposed. In fact, the unilateral or multilateral nature of peace resolution is not of the utmost importance. Despite the messiness of the solution, power was distributed unevenly among a number of factions, ethnicities and individuals.

If this conclusion holds true, it would provide a striking discontinuity between US Cold War intervention and intervention after the "New World Order." The unilateral nature of the solution may be partly the result of hegemony itself, as Buena de la Mesquita's power exception does not hold true (Dixon and Senses 548). The key distinction is distribution of power post-settlement. Though the idea that the US would seek to distribute power beyond one individual differs from Cold War policy, it follows logically from the

norms argument in conditions of systemic hegemony. This must be clarified slightly, during conflict – in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, and Somalia – the US has found it convenient to collude with local groups in conflict and peace-resolution. This is not new or surprising, and is probably more material realism than idealism. However, after conflict, where we would expect the resurgence of democratic norms in affecting the US public and leaders, we find that democratic norms heavily influence the peace settlement. In Iraq because it may be argued that the present "peace settlement" is complicated by the de facto continuation of military intervention, contributing to nationalism and injuring US-Iraqi relations. The US may accurately be accused of heavy-handed post-peace meddling, but the peace displays a divided power structure, rather than a return to dependent clientele. In Afghanistan, despite employing Northern Alliance members to assist in fighting, and granting some of those persons positions of power, the Northern Alliance has not been unilaterally granted centralized power in Iraq.

Therefore, democracies tend to follow the conflict-proper with a less centralized peace settlement, as expected from democratic norms. This contention also holds true in the Lebanon War, through which the United States was Israel's prime benefactor. The unilateral nature of the intervention in addition to the historical perception, of Israel's neighbors, that Israel is an aggressive unilateral state, hurt prospects for international cooperation. The same is true for the United States in Iraq.

Hegemonic leadership bids best occur through multilateral frameworks – employing hegemonic leadership within the context of an extant mechanisms or institutions. It is not clear that when core interests are threatened democracies act significantly different from autocracies, which follows from Kegley and Hermann’s normative argument. The outcome of this war had negative effects for Israel’s leaders, especially Prime Minister Olmert, and the new party Kadima – which may not live until its name (*tomorrow*) as a result. Feedback, especially death from intervention, generally hurts the sustainability of democratic intervention. Under a multilateral umbrella this may lead to defection rather than withdrawal – as with Spain. Feedback plays a large part in affecting future interventions and the ability for democratic states to intervene. Unlike state actors, Hizballah had no formal army and thus presented a tactical problem. But it is clear that the “like units” argument is exacerbated by the present US agenda of anti-terrorism. Groups perceived as having terrorist leanings, even those democratically elected are not as likely to be seen as democratic entities as would be democratically elected governments of states. Hamas has basically inherited a state but such de facto sovereignty in league with a terrorist label further detracts from the perception of “like units.” In the case of Israel, this may have made goals less realistically. Regardless, Israel’s public was massively dissatisfied with the war, and theorists have begun chiding powers for unilateral action (*Impact Of The Lebanon War On Hamas And Kadima*). Similarly, the US withdrew from Somalia after 18 deaths,

producing a greater aversion to African peacekeeping (Adebajo 72). The articulation of Clinton’s intervention guidelines – the PDD-25 (examined later) – also displayed leaders’ aversion to peacekeeping. The media plays a large role in shaping and promoting ideas that can feed back on publics and thus leaders in democratic states. The same is not the case if the public has no relationship to its government.

Soft, Non-Military, or Coercive Intervention: Coercive intervention is third-party involvement in a dispute, involving soft power but not military power. Just as there are bound to be certain differences that complicated the comparative analysis of cases, coercive intervention poses this problem particularly acutely. In order to consider sanctions or other coercive involvement in conflict hegemonic, it must be spearheaded by a hegemonic leadership bid. Since the fall of the USSR, “half the world’s population” has at one time lived under sanctions (Euclid 459).

The cases dealt with here provide two models of coercive intervention. The first, punitive sanctions against Iraq, deal with the ability of states to employ coercive pressure to punish states into compliance. The second, Russian diplomatic engagement displays a greater tendency towards the bargaining model – in contrast to punitive. In either case, the ultimate goal to produce regime or policy-change, may be aided by the presence of opposition groups (Euclid 470). Aung San Suu Kyi has called for sanctions against Burma, as had the ANC in South Africa. Punitive engagement detracts from the international legitimacy

of the state in favor of those opposition groups. However, the effect may be a state crackdown or conciliation. The presence of such groups, however, indicates a level of democracy, in contrast to more autocratic governments. Autocracies, because they are best poised to control their economies, may actually be emboldened by sanctions – as Iraq (471).

Euclid's article raises the idea of bargaining versus punitive methods and models of intervention. He draws distinctions between blunt sanctions, and smart sanctions that have generally not been applied by the US or UN. The general nature of sanctions applied follows logically from the idea that states may use sanctions as a cost-effective alternative or precursor to war. This would appeal to democratic leaders as a cost-effective option to placate publics and maintain their political survival. The negative humanitarian effect is generally recognized, especially in the case of blunt execution. The humanitarian response, to which democracies are generally more receptive because of civil society and the growing concern of humanitarianism to democratic publics, such as humanitarian aid may actually lengthen conflict by providing aid to militant groups as in Bosnia (Stedman 15). The exacerbation of humanitarian crises may also contribute to the difficulty of political solution. Moreover, because punitive sanctions may embolden governments just as they grant legitimacy to opposition groups, sanctions may also create new groups detracting from or complicating a solution. Sanctions have generally been applied by developed countries (Euclid 460). Moreover, coercive intervention is usually goal-based and is not always

concerned with the dimensions of peace resolution. This was the case with sanctions against Iraq preceding the Gulf War. The sanctions regime following the War may have suffered from a lack of clear goals, rather destroying Iraq's capability to be a rogue aggressor state.

Thus one would expect democratic hegemons to be more likely to apply sanctions or coercive diplomatic and economic pressure. The effectiveness of sanctions in reversing or deterring policies and actions may be limited, but can produce results. Democratic presence in a hegemon may not produce a positive result. Sanctions are usually state-centered and thus produce a disproportionate effect on the state rather than sub-state (non-state) actors. Punitive sanctions clearly have less specific goals, but the weakening of state capacity allows the intrusion of other states with expansionist or aspiring-hegemonic policies. The result of sanctions and a movement from cooperative soft-power engagement to a confrontational stance also injures the ability of states to collect information. The effect on democracies here may be different because information tends to be freer than non-democracies. However, it is not possible to claim that media has a greater effect on either broad-label of regime configuration. Rather, the effect of faulty information on democracies tends to have a greater effect on the public that is directly related to resultant state policy. Djingoism is no less popular in non-democracies, indeed may be more so, but information can be better tempered and controlled to fit state-policy and interests. This is not always the case with democracies and thus as sanctions to

produce effects, the likelihood that contradictory information will produce a policy change is more likely, but may depend on media framing as well. US sanctions have remained relatively consistent against Cuba since their inception, but the US has led efforts to step up sanctions against Iran based on new information – every few years. Iraq sanctions also underwent changes – and the coercive intervention of inspectors was also affected by US pressure affected by the media and access to information.

The punitive and bargaining bifurcation may reveal something about the nature of democratic employment of sanctions. Punitive sanctions have longer-term, less-clear goals, and tend to be less receptive to change – as with Cuba – though key interests may be at stake. Conversely, Iran – while sanctions are punitive – has been targeted by successively evolving series and types of sanctions designed to produce particular policy changes. Part of Euclid’s argument is that the Iraq sanctions regime did produce certain compliance, the same may be said about Iran. Based on the initial framing of the dispute, democracies may be more resilient as compliance does occur, falling prey to idealism. This is not any less true with non-democracies, and clearly Nigeria’s goals for West African hegemony represent broad ideologically-based interpretable goals. This is a stumbling block for all states, but the media and public in democracies can have a greater involvement in clarifying goals and compliance.

Democratic Coercive Intervention: The Iraq Sanctions Regime After the Cold War

The enmity bred between the US and its former client Iraq after the Gulf War

contributed to a desire for greater action, no doubt aided by some demands in the US to topple the regime then. Sanctions intensified after the conflict partly to disable the Iraq regime after the limited but successful repulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The initial invasion had limited goals, and was hegemonic military intervention. According to Euclid, Martin and Laurenti have validated the view that sanctions attempt to create escalating pressure of increasing sanctions to punish states (Euclid 460). Indeed sanctions may because they are one tool in a spectrum of policy instruments (472). Because the goals of sanctions are broadly defined – even in context usually – negative effects of sanctions were not initially taken into account. In Iraq, there was a surge in child mortality rates and malnourishment concurrent with a drastic decline in quality of life, health infrastructure and GDP, because of the embargo on the main source of income – oil (467). Because of the authoritarian nature of the Iraq regime, and its strong control over its economy, these effects created significant bad will between Iraqis – and humanitarians in general – and the United States.

The goals of sanctions were broad, requiring full compliance without concessions, though this was supported by the US and much of the international community (476). US pressure for an escalating series of resolutions, beginning with 660, then 661 (463) validates the contention that sanctions are often seen as an escalating mechanism. Moreover, despite UN and US demands for full, uncompromising compliance, there was limited Iraqi compliance (Euclid 462). The fact that two sanctions regimes led to

US spearheaded militarized intervention may rely more on feedback as well. Though sanctions had limited compliance, such compliance occurred over the course of more than a decade. Such results may not be encouraging especially if sanctions coercive intervention is not perceived as achieving results. This may explain, until recently, the increasingly militant rhetoric toward Iran and explains the escalating rhetoric toward Iraq. Therefore, political survival of leaders becomes contingent on results and may overshadow the effectiveness of sanctions, leading to conflict. If sanctions are perceived as ineffective as a policy response, then democracies would be more likely to escalate policies as a result of the perception of ineffectiveness for their own political careers – or to fight for progressive sanctions.

According to Euclid, Kofi Annan described sanctions as a the “blunt instrument,” (Euclid 468) that posed a dichotomous problem between preserving peace and human life. Just as sanctions and inspections destroyed the capacity of the state to prosecute aggression, it also hurt the state’s ability to provide social services. This not only hurt sub-state Iraqi perception of the US, UN and its intentions, but also may have created a gap in power, which created a favorable environment for sub-state actors that could complicate peace resolution – as terrorism.⁶ Sanctions against the Iraqi government also contributed to the de facto sovereignty of Kurdistan in Iraq, further weakening the central state and increasing the tacit recognition of other actors in the conflict. A similar

phenomenon occurred during the de facto independence of Nagorno-Karabakh in (physically) Azerbaijan.

The dual demands of humanitarian preservation and punitive intervention, led to the Oil for Food program, which helped mitigate the humanitarian disaster produced by sanctions (and wars) (Euclid 468). As expected, humanitarian assistance contributed to government coffers. More specifically, it allowed the creation of a large black-market, and obscenely wealthy government officials from oil smuggling. Blunt punitive engagements appears to have limited success in achieving some objectives. It is unable to achieve major objectives (Euclid 476), and therefore probably does not contribute strongly to the resolution of peace. Rather, Euclid contends that the impact and success are more likely to be based around bargaining dynamics.

Autocratic: Nagorno-Karabakh and the new Russian Hegemony:

Euclid’s conclusion is interesting in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK)⁷ Conflict, because Armenia’s internal political debate over policy options reflects a similar duality. Similar to punitive versus bargaining strategies, Armenia’s debate was over step-by-step versus comprehensive methodology to peace resolution. The step-by-step process, applying rewards for partial compliance, more represents a bargaining model; whereas “package” resolution requires rewards for full compliance and presumably punitive measures for non-compliance. The war began in 1988, complicated by the nebulous political situation and lack of traditional

⁶ The expansion of terrorist networks in Ba’athist Iraq was not a threat.

⁷ Not the Democratic Republic of North Korea.

sovereignty. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh was disputed under the Soviet Union, the last instance of which was a NK Soviet request for secession from the Azerbaijan Soviet in 1988, which began the present phase of the conflict (Zourabian 252).

Three key issues are identified as shaping the conditions for analysis. First, the conflict began in a regional environment of political collapse and then transition. Armenia was a transitioning democracy at best before 1995 (See: Appendix A), whereas Azerbaijan exhibited far greater tendencies toward autocracy. The political status of the disputants: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh were undetermined at the start of conflict. Secondly, political transitions have created new prospects for peace at the level of individual leaders. Thirdly, the most important aspect of this case is the demonstration of initial Russian hegemonic tendency in providing an initial peace-agreement. The subsequent years of negotiation have shown Russian willingness to work within a multi-lateral framework for a comprehensive peace with all parties.

The collapse of the system of soviets led to political vacuums in the Caucasus. This may have been offset in Armenia by the adoption of preexisting political structures. Tel-Patrossian, leader of the Karabakh Committee under the Soviet system, quickly became the first Armenian president. The Karabakh Committee's existence also helped "lay the foundation for a national army within a few months" (Papazian 238). Each side relied on mercenaries (especially Russian mercenaries), whereas

Azerbaijan was significantly weaker militarily and relied also on foreign mujahidin. As is expected of a democracy in crisis – and especially a transitioning democracy – Armenia was initially more aggressive and more successful. The Armenia policy initially, however was for the security of Armenians in NK, and not for the region's independence as evidenced by a 1992 interview of Tel-Patrossian by Turkish daily Cumhuriyet (Papazian 238). These democracies, Russia and Armenia, cannot be treated in the same way as those who have developed institutions, norms, and records of norm-compliance. There is a question of the baseline indicators for democracy, but as a transitioning partial democracy, there is a contrast in the effects of democracy on Russian hegemony versus US hegemony – clearly democratic.

The main political transitions have occurred in Russia and Armenia. Firstly, the fall of the USSR paved the way for the election of Boris Yeltsin. Armenia relied heavily on Russian economic and military support, though between 1988 and 1991 support for USSR-Armenia alliance declined (Papazian 239). Russian support has consistently been a hallmark of Armenian security policy, however, and was aided by the embargos enacted by Azerbaijan in 1991 and Turkey in 1993. Russian and Armenian collusion was an attempt to provide Russian regional security through Armenia. This relationship is not surprising given the similar democracy ratings of the two countries and the historical religious relationship, but was aided by the amity between Tel-Patrossian and Yeltsin (). In 1991, Russia and Armenia concluded the

Treaty of Friendship, in May 1992 the Collective Security Treaty, and in 1997 the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The presence of mujahidin, and the cultural differences in religion and increasingly governance, no doubt hurt relations between Russia and Azerbaijan by altering the perception of its similarity politically.

Russia managed to broker a cease-fire agreement in 1994 and then the OSCE gained a mandate for negotiations. From that point, Tel-Petrossian favored a step-by-step process similar to the bargaining model. Between 1994 and 1998, little progress was made on the hundreds of thousands of refugees on both sides or the political status of NK. Domestic constitutional referenda and coup attempts affected democracy rankings and probably elite-orientation as well (Papazian 245). Tel-Patrossian's ouster (resignation) in favor of Kocharian, who is from NK, was supposedly due to the unpopularity of the step-by-step method. Kocharian had long advocated package deal (Zourabian 253). Kocharian's 1998 position began and ended with demands for independence rather than minority protection:

- "(1) No vertical links between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, which means that Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be subordinated to Azerbaijan;
- (2) security guarantees for the population of Nagorno-Karabakh;
- (3) preservation of the control over the land link with Armenia." (Zourabian 260)

While the shift may have been rhetorical in reality more than it was a shift in policy (Papazian 242), this reflects conditions on the ground and NK de facto sovereignty. Kocharian espoused that the conflict was territorial between

Armenia and Azerbaijan a large shift from the initial OSCE framework of three parties (Zourabian 253). Moreover, the Paris and Key West land-swap talks of 2002 helped de-legitimize the package option by illustrating potential successes of the step-by-step process (Zourabian 254). Clearly Armenian politics is very sensitive to the lack of results in the short-term.⁸ Because of Armenia's democracy ranking, some amount of feedback is expected, and has in cases led to militarized re-escalation.

The key factor in the success of the movement toward peace has been twofold: Russian hegemonic leadership; and a multilateral, inclusive bargaining framework. The initial cease-fire, while unilateral, was instrumental in cementing multilateral negotiations through the OSCE, thus assisting the formalization of mechanisms for negotiation (Zourabian 253). After the appointment of a French representative to the OSCE negotiating team in addition to the Russian member, Azerbaijan fought strongly for a US representative to dilute bias (258). This may also have been to challenge Russian hegemony but the US did not spearhead or lead any efforts. Tel-Petrossian's 1996 veto of an OSCE resolution during the 1996 Libson Summit because it would violate Armenia's mandate to negotiate illustrates the general consistency of Armenia's position on NK's murky legal status (257). However, despite these setbacks, the OSCE framework has helped greatly to force all parties toward a more realistic compromise solution rather than an eternal struggle of unconstrained state interests. There are worries that violence could re-ignite

⁸ Changes have occurred once every four years.

(Transitions Online), however as of November 29, 2007 the US, French, and Russian delegations presented Basic Principles to all sides in an attempt to create a final agreement before Armenian elections in 2008. The details of agreement, especially on final status issues, may not be completely perfected, however there is a basic recognition of what will occur. There will be land swapping and NK will remain independent and likely have free access to the Lachin Corridor (on Azerbaijani territory) that connects NK to Armenia. The conflict is not ended, but there is a large amount of partial compliance that may become fully internationally legitimized compliance in a very short period of time.

Conclusions for the effects of Democracy:

The most sensitive issue in the measurement of these cases is whether Russia was a democratic state at the time of its diplomatic intervention in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Polity IV data suggest that Russia was not democratic, but might have been a transitioning democracy. Transitioning democracies behave differently than established democracies, additionally the crisis of political collapse no doubt weighed heavily on leaders (Kegley and Hermann 516). Russia's status may have included greater attempts at rhetorical democracy to placate the West rather than actual transition. Russia may therefore have had a greater propensity to support Armenia as a result of its partially democratic government in addition to cultural similarity – as suggested by Dixon and Senese.

The Russian intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh has clearly been more successful in advancing the cause of peace resolution for two reasons. Firstly, the approach to coercive investment, however framed,⁹ affects the objectives of intervention. Objectives are not really important to this debate except in their relationship to ultimate peace resolution. If objectives are created irrespective of the ultimate cause of peace and peace resolution, the approach will not be as likely to affect peace resolution. Generally, however, methodology does affect the resolution of peace: engagement versus isolation, and partial versus full compliance. The cases suggest that peace resolution may be best served by engagement in accordance with partial compliance (toward full compliance). Secondly, unilateralism in hegemonic intervention has a limited place. Hegemony is a *bid to lead intervention*, and so hegemonic intervention by definition necessitates some degree of unilateral hegemonic leadership initially. Adebajo concludes hegemonic leadership was necessary to sustain interventions in Somalia (the US) and Liberia (Nigeria). In Bosnia, Clinton was convinced American hegemonic leadership was necessary in light of European inaction (Morales 94). This case resulted in military intervention, but the point is still apparent. Hegemonic leadership is also sometimes necessary to spearhead impetus for intervention. The US has been instrumental in employing sanctions against certain countries like Iran, Iraq, and Cuba.

⁹ (Bargaining, step-by-step, punitive, package in the case terminology)

Unilateral hegemonic leadership, however, cannot persist beyond a certain point. At a certain point this must move to a multilateral framework, involving the compromise of interests in order to achieve bigger goals. Unilateral sanctions are not effective without collusion from other states, which is why sanctions, when applied, generally do involve coalitions or multilateral organizations like the UN. In terms of intervention in active conflict, the standard should be the conclusion of military conflict.¹⁰ Even multilateral sanctions are unlikely to reverse aggression anyway as was the case with the regime after the invasion of Kuwait and prior to the Gulf War. Multilateral sanctions are still more likely to be successful at influencing capabilities and dyadic relationships during conflict. The Azerbaijani and Turkish embargoes were instrumental in solidifying Armenian political support for an alliance with Russia, which had been under reconsideration. Russia, in the NK case, appears to have more successfully executed a withdrawal from its unilateral position than has the US or Israel in negotiations. This is probably explained by feedback and the need and appearance to appear hard in the face of non-compliance. Without efficient results their careers are in jeopardy, and this may make it difficult for democratic hegemonies not to escalate intervention in the face of non-compliance with coercive intervention. This does not always mean this will result in military conflict as with Somalia, Iraq, and Lebanon, but it does mean that the likelihood of an escalation

¹⁰ Unilateral intervention may be employed to produce a peaceful settlement but should not be employed during the dispute settlement – after the cessation of hostilities.

of democratic hegemonies' policies and rhetoric is greater than with non-democratic hegemonies.

It is clear that while sanctions may be employed as escalating pressure, sanctions may also be employed by democracies to placate public demands for action where greater action is unlikely to be employed. As stated earlier, feedback may actually make intervention more likely by increasing public knowledge on the issue and creating general frustration over lack of results or action. The other key issue is how norms affect the perceptions of leaders, elites, and public's perceptions of like units. Democracies are also more likely to engage in a more flexible bargaining process and more amicable relationship with states perceived as "like." Outside of conflict and intervention decision-making, this does not necessarily mean that democracies are more likely to have good relationship with other democracies.¹¹ It does mean that democracies are more likely to have amicable relationships with democracies greater than with non-democracies on the whole. However there is a trump card in the US War on Terrorism, the massive shift in priorities from PDD-25 to the Bush Doctrine – in which heavy restrictions on intervention morphed into pre-emptive and preventive ideological wars – represents a shift in US perceptions of "rogue" or "terrorist" states as the super-other.¹² This explains

¹¹ Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt all receive significant amounts US military aid.

¹² This is evidenced by Hamas's election and de facto sovereignty. Despite the relative moderation of Hamas after elections – and their democratic election and de facto sovereignty in Gaza – relations with the US and Israel are significantly

why the US was more likely to be inflexible and heavy-handed with Iraq than Russia with Armenia. Russia and Armenia both saw themselves as transitioning Christian democracies with a relationship less strained than others. Azerbaijan was not assisted by the presence of foreign mujahidin. Hegemons have a large breadth in setting the agenda of international labels – or dichotomies of perception.¹³ This influences relevant leaders perceptions of like units and thus perception of how bounded their decisions are by norms – supported by Kegley and Hermann (1995).

Non-Intervention:

There are myriad reasons why intervention may not occur – non-intervention, so a brief description will suffice, which will be greatly clarified in the case of Rwanda. Regional hegemony increases the likelihood of hegemonic intervention by adding interests that may coincide with intervention. Intervention by a regional hegemon is especially likely if American interests coincide with intervention as well. Thus an absence of regional hegemony, or a lack of American interest in intervention makes non-intervention more likely. Additionally, lack of multilateral, bilateral, or unilateral initiative or consensus internationally also detracts from the likelihood of intervention. Opposition may grow to hegemonic action by other aspiring hegemons or by coalitions as with China in Darfur and Russia and China in Iran. However, hegemonic inaction or apathy

more strained by the perception of the group and area as “terrorist” – the super-other.

¹³ Communism vs. Democracy, Terrorism vs. Freedom

may also affect the calculation of other states’ interests toward intervention. In democracies a lack of popular support, media and political framing of the issue and feedback also play a role in deterring future intervention.

Inaction: How Somali Fighters Killed American Troops and Prevented a Rwanda Intervention

There are three main reasons for American inaction in Rwanda during the genocide in the summer of 1994. The case itself need not be explained here in full. The Arusha Accords had ended fighting between partisan Tutsi militias and the Hutu government of Rwanda. The UN had dispatched a small force of 2500 commanded by Dallaire as UNAMIR (*Power Bystanders to Genocide:VI*) to help implement the Arusha Accords. On August 7, 1994 the plane of the Rwandan President was shot down landing in Kigali, beginning nearly 4 months of massacres of Tutsis by Hutus. With the exception of intervention early in April by European powers and US troops to withdraw their citizens, there was virtually no initiative on intervention. The US and France both drew up plans for interventions that began to be executed, with problems and delays, no earlier than July. By this time the RPF militias, who had been stationed in Kigali under the Arush Accords, had toppled the Hutu government and mostly ended the genocide.

Intervention did not occur because there was a lack of will at the international level, and domestic American conditions significantly impacted by the presence of democracy. The lack of action or consensus internationally, unlike in the case of Liberia in which there were merely problems of consensus and the

threat of hegemonic dominance. Because hegemonic unilateralism would have been beneficial, if hegemonic intervention is a necessary condition to world peace, then the US may have in some sense skirted its duties. This may be implicit in a statement by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on May 1 that a genocide finding could commit the US to actually "do something" (Power *Bystanders...*:VII). European states similarly were wary of peacekeeping efforts beyond the initial evacuation of their citizens. Not surprisingly, the democratic states of Western Europe and the United States saw Rwanda's strategic interest only in terms of the evacuation of their own personnel. The justification that US leaders may not have been aware of the potential scope of conflict and thus potentially humanitarian interests appears not to hold water. In an April 11 memo prepared for the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy stated that "Unless both sides can be convinced to return to the peace process, a massive (hundreds of thousands of deaths) bloodbath will ensue" (Power *Bystanders...*:VII). The consistent appeals of UNAMIR Commander Roméo Dallaire were repeatedly met with opposition by the US (until July) on the grounds that it could escalate into a costly American venture (Power *Bystanders...*:IX).

In part this was caused by a significant difference in various parties' perceptions of the interests at stake, the players, motives, and nature of the conflict itself. There were some meager attempts at non-hegemonic coercive intervention, and indeed UNAMIR was present. European states had initially wanted to pull their peace-keepers in response to non-

compliance with the Arusha Accords (prior to the genocide) (Power *Bystanders...*:V). Such action played directly into the hands of Hutu commanders who most sought to benefit from a European and American withdrawal. Because of the presence of democracy, European states but more importantly the US may not have been able to see past the interests of its citizens. Additionally, the US's involvement in Rwanda was shallow, and US officials were no doubt inclined to trust Rwandan officials, representing a sovereign state with a commitment to the peace agreement (Power *Bystanders...*:V). Additionally, because of the lack of US experience with the region, policymakers expected a certain level of ethnic violence. They may potentially have underestimated the scale and form of violence, but the US also did not react to ethnically-motivated killings in Brundi (Power *Bystanders...*:V).

Indeed it is clear that the perception of interests did not extend beyond the evacuation of civilians, following which Clinton suggested it was a "Job well done" (Power *Bystanders...*:VI), at which point Rwanda was not even a priority rhetorically (*Bystanders...*:VIII). Because the US was also inclined to see the conflict as one of a breakdown of peace talks or governmental infighting, which is to be expected from the normative argument, there was also a perception of the need for internal political settlement and solution. This same claim was forwarded by Stedman for Bosnian parties in military conflict, but this is a case not of international (and) intra-state, but rather intra-state and inter-group. Thus the problem was articulated in

terms of 'national interest' and 'humanitarian consequences' but not on the level of human tragedy (*Bystanders...: VIII*).

Effects of Democracy on Hegemonic Non-Intervention:

The effects of democracy on US inaction are striking. Norms have a more pronounced effect on the government, societal, and individual levels of democracies than non-democracies. The US clearly placed too much faith in a peace-resolution viewpoint of the issue. The US was apt to take assurances from the Rwandan government that it was committed to the Arusha Accords, and that that was connected to the conflict. The US accepted UNAMIR only after significant French lobbying pressure (*Power Bystanders...:IV*). Even having accepted Dallaire's intervention plan, and having agreed to send equipment the US still pushed a return to the Arusha Accords (*Power Bystanders...:XI*). Additionally, because of the awareness of hegemony, most officials defined intervention as ethical (*Power Bystanders...:XII*). Leaders tended to exaggerate the precedent set by an intervention in Rwanda, possibly also seeing intervention as counterproductive. Members of the Clinton Administration detracted from the issue of genocide in part because of unfamiliarity in dealing with non-state institutions and groups, and a general ignorance of sub-state issues. The American public also treated the problem "as a civil war requiring a cease-fire or as a 'peacekeeping problem' requiring a UN withdrawal... [not a] genocide demanding instant action" (*Power Bystanders...:X*). Generally officials and the public suffered from a general lack of knowledge of Rwanda, which

meant a general lack of domestic lobby pressure on the issue.

In part they are attributable to the articulation of PDD-25, the Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, which restricted US involvement in intervention in general. This was largely a feedback response from the unpopularity of the death of American soldiers in Somalia, and thus a general aversion to African peacekeeping (*Power Bystanders...:IV*). Bodies of Belgian soldiers returned to Brussels on April 14 drew a parallel to Somalia and on April 15 Warren Christopher wrote to Albright instructing her to demand a full UNAMIR withdrawal, backing Belgian demands (*Power Bystanders...:IX*). PDD-25 weighed heavily into the minds of American policy makers. However, after the lack of intervention, guilt has fed back on the public and American leadership, spurring interest in issues like Darfur (*Power Bystanders...:XIII*). In democracies, feedback generally occurs on the public and is framed by leaders, the media, and to a certain extent intellectual and academic work. Democratic configurations also allow popular desires to more directly influence leaders' interests, creating greater pressure through freer access to information and allowing the creation of organizations. In autocracies, the feedback effect is directly on elites and leaders if at all, whereas popular feedback is secondary except in the form of widespread mobilized dissent. Autocratic failures in intervention, like the incomplete nature of ECOMOG's first information, may spur future intervention. US failure in Somalia

weighed heavily on Clinton, who saw a strong public aversion to the death of American soldiers and had no desire to jeopardize his presidency with a repeat intervention. The conditions provided by PDD-25 are very narrow by the standards of the precedent of the Cold War and the New World Order proposed by Bush. A very realist document, although Clinton's policy was not intended to be completely realist, PDD-25 narrowly defined American interests in supporting or supplying troops for intervention – whether or not American involvement was requested or solicited.¹⁴ The US voted for UNAMIR in the Security Council only after clear assurances that the US would not submit troops (*Power Bystanders...:IV*). Especially since foreign policy doctrine was growing increasingly anti-interventionist, Rwanda became even less of a priority. The US had few specialists and little knowledge of Rwanda throughout the genocide even on the highest levels of policy.

V. Conclusions for the Effects of Democracy on Intervention in Unipolarity:

Traditional realism looks upon hegemonic states as those most powerful within an anarchic international system. The proper use of this power could grant unprecedented scope and control to hegemons in intervening. Liberals and neo-liberals look upon existing institutions such as the UN and regional security arrangements as forums for coordination of policy and the proper place through which states bid for hegemonic leadership. Constructivism stresses the effect of norms and beliefs on state and international action. The

¹⁴ PDD-25 from FAS.org.

benefit of the Democratic Peace Literature is that it focuses the theories of international relations and tools of social science on the problem of democratic governance and its effects.

Democratic Peace Literature has not previously examined democracies in positions of hegemony bidding for intervention leadership (increasingly important given the growing number of interventions versus traditional wars). Hegemony may provide such a state with an unprecedented opportunity to promote norms. Under a bipolar system, states had greater latitude in choosing their benefactors.¹⁵ Hegemony offers a dichotomous view of compliance or non-compliance with the most powerful state. The same is generally true with aspiring and regional hegemons,¹⁶ for which systemic hegemony provides a potential threat and incentive compelling aspiring and regional hegemons to comply with at least some systemically-promoted norms.

The Gulf War illustrates that states without hegemonic blessing, those in contravention of hegemonic norms, risk conflict with the hegemon itself. Conflict need not embody the traditional power disparity rules, but can injure a state's depth of institutional participation (like the WTO, UN committees, regional security). This has also led to an increasing categorization of states either as rogue or status quo. The War on Terror has had a significant effect on shaping American perception of its interest and of the "other." In this case,

¹⁵ At least three possible actions were possible: alignment with one of the two poles, or non-alignment.

¹⁶ A case could be made for China or Venezuela.

the US is not likely to have an amicable relationship in crisis with states that are democratic, or organizations that are democratic, if that organization is perceived to be a terrorist organization. The vast amounts of money in the form of aid and anti-terrorism support compel states to pay lip-service to norms to achieve those benefits. Non-compliance reduces the likelihood of achieving those benefits.

Regardless of the regime configuration of the hegemon, hegemony may be more likely to support autonomy of disputed regions in the case of territorial disputes. They may tend to support the status quo prior to conflict. Kuwait's independence was restored, and sanctions in Iraq (in addition to the two recent wars) were also were instrumental in aiding the cause of de facto Kurdish sovereignty. The same was true in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, which has maintained a de facto status quo since the cessation of outright conflict in the early 90s. Partly this is influenced by the success or by the compliance of conflicting parties. Sanctions destroyed Iraq's material capability to attack Kurdistan and Kuwait, enforcing the status quo by punitive measures, supported by American military power. The Caucasus status quo was maintained by Russian political hegemony – or an attempt to reassert traditional Soviet and Russian dominance of the region (proving Russian supra-regional (but not global) hegemony over the Caucasus). OSCE multilateral frameworks have reinforced the political conditions of the initial cease-fire agreement. In the 2006 Lebanon War, Israel failed at destroying Hizballah's capacity to the extent it had

initially hoped, and so the status quo was maintained by a failure to successfully assert military hegemony. Successful interventions by **democratic hegemons** appear to more equitably distribute power in international and domestic arrangements.¹⁷

One of the key differences is in political solutions following intervention. The US has been significantly more willing to attempt actual democratic distribution of power or, at the very least, a distribution amongst elements than it was under the bipolar Cold War structure. Nigeria proved far more willing to accommodate Charles Taylor politically between 1997 and 2003, after which it was forced to once again intervene and eventually extradite him. The transitional governments of Iraq and Afghanistan were not handed over to US allies outright immediately after the invasions.¹⁸ This issue deserves a greater body of quantitative research, though the available amount of cases may not be sufficient.

It is unclear if democracies may also be predisposed to overstay their welcomes in the actual peace settlement. Lengthy

¹⁷ Because the Lebanon War was not definitively a success for Israel it is not included in this statement. This is not to declare a winner to conflict but rather to proclaim that the result of the war put Israeli military hegemony into question in a way that had not existed in the 29 years prior. (Impact Of The Lebanon War On Hamas And Kadima).

¹⁸ There was no doubt a large degree of graft that occurred in the process of creating transitional governments. Nevertheless, ensuring republican constitutional checks and democratic principles of self-governance caused the US to place significant constraints on its own ability to act not characteristic of military powers.

occupation has proved troubling in Iraq post-invasion, and the costly nature of prolonged occupation helped create the gap in sovereignty that allowed for the free-reign of Hizballah in South Lebanon (following its military incursions into Lebanon to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization). Democracies have the institutional capacity to alter and adapt successful models for unilateral leadership leading to multilateral peace keeping after conflict, through the selection of leaders. Successfully employed interventions *can* actually aid democratization as well. The key is that democratic hegemons must actually undertake this practice as morally incumbent but also tactically and strategically prudent in maintaining proper domestic, regional, and global security. Hegemons must take care not to exacerbate problems of occupation and resistance and likewise to provide an equitable and lasting political settlement. Democracies are more likely to win wars in which they engage, they also have the benefit of self-regulating political systems. If leaders and strategies are properly affected by lessons of past intervention, democracies have an unrivalled ability to aid the cause of short equitable political solutions.

However, the US particularly has demonstrated its unwillingness to provide unilateral hegemonic leadership in certain key cases. Unilateral leadership will cause friction, but so long as multilateral post-peace settlement mechanisms are employed, frictions will not necessarily deter benefits either to the hegemon or to the previously conflicting parties. For the same reasons that democracies would be more or less likely

to intervene – norms and feedback – they are also more likely to veer off track. Democracy probably does not affect the choice of unilateral strategies differently than non-democracies in that neither is organically more or less predisposed toward unilateralism. Democratic hegemons are more likely to be affected by public beliefs (and the beliefs of leaders), whereas non-democratic states tend to be affected less directly by feedback from their publics.¹⁹

Thus feedback from previous intervention experience and beliefs occurs differently if states have instituted aspects of democratic governance. The ability to select leaders allows a far more direct connection between public norms, attitudes, and beliefs and those of their leaders. Democracies, because of more direct feedback, can also more effectively prosecute interventions because the goals of intervention are likely to be more transparent. They are also more likely to prematurely terminate interventions resulting in high costs to the state, its people, or its institutions.

Nigeria's bid for West African hegemony reflected underlying preferences for regional hegemony rather than specifically defined and pursued goals, leading to problems with prosecution of the ECOMOG intervention. A greater body of research must be developed to isolate and quantify the effects of Democratic Peace theories on hegemonic intervention, though available cases may

¹⁹ In extreme cases, exorbitant costs or deaths may deter a government from risking public unrest. The institutional channels for public expression of dissent, that are present in democratic states, are not present in non-democracies.

be limited. This paper has analyzed the major components affecting the small body of cases (reflecting different types of intervention) after the Cold War. Whatever the conclusions of future

studies, the interests of global peace and conflict resolution are best served by unilateral hegemonic military leadership in conjunction with a flexible multilateral political resolution.

Appendix A: Democracy Benchmarks:

Military Intervention:

Case 1	Systemic Role	Dem (2004):	Aut (2004):	Democratic?
2005-2006	Lebanon: Disputant	-66	-66	No (Partial at Best)
(2004 - Last year of Data)	Hizballah: Disputant	NA	NA	No
	Israel: Hegemon	10	0	Yes

Case 2	Systemic Role	Dem: 1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
1990 - 2003	Disputant: Taylor	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
	Disputant: Liberia	-77	-77	-77	-77	-77	-77	-88	3	3	3	3	3	3	-88	-88
	Hegemon: Nigeria	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-88	4	4	4	4	4	4

Aut: 1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	Democratic?
NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	No
-77	-77	-77	-77	-77	-77	-88	3	3	3	3	3	3	-88	-88	No
5	5	5	7	7	6	6	6	-88	0	0	0	0	0	0	No

Non-Military Intervention:

Case 3	Systemic Role	Dem: 1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Democratic Hegemony	Iraq: Disputant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Kuwait: Disputant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	USA: Hegemon	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10

Aut: 1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	Democratic?
9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	No
7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	No
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Yes

Case 4	Systemic Role	Dem: 1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Non-Democratic Hegemony	Armenia: Disputant	7	7	7	7	4	0	0	6	6	6	6	6	5	5
	Azerbaijan: Disputant	1	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Russia: Hegemon	NA	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	7	7	7	7	7

Appendix B: Benchmarks for Dispute/Resolution:

Dispute: Democratic Military Intervention:

Territorial and political sovereignty battle between Lebanese government and Hizballah in which Hizballah has challenged the government's political and military monopoly and have challenged the political framework.

Non-Democratic Military Intervention:

Charles Taylor's militias had created a civil and then trans-national war in which Liberia was embroiled in conflict, and the Liberian government struggled to compete with Taylor.

Democratic Non-Military Intervention:

Iraq's claims that Kuwait was a part of its sovereign territory, and then invaded Kuwait.

Non-Democratic Non-Military Intervention:

Azerbaijan and Armenia had both claimed the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Resolution: Democratic Military Intervention:

Israel – Evacuation from Lebanon but expressed desire to destroy Hizballah.

Lebanon – Reassertion of sovereignty in former Hizballah territory but significant political fighting between the government and Hizballah

Hizballah – Continued expressed desire to destroy Israel and the occupation, continued lack of full compliance with the political and peace processes.

- Low-Degree of Partial Compliance



“(A) Messed Up Arab Situation!”

“Lebanon with no head!”

“Palestine with two heads!”

“Iraq with three heads!”

Non-Democratic Military Intervention:

Charles Taylor – Six years after his election, he was eventually ousted and later extradited by Nigeria to the International Criminal Court.

Liberia – Having ousted Taylor, Liberia elected a new president and appears to be on an improving course of democratic and economic development.

Nigeria – Nigeria's insistence on stability has contributed to its apathy over the Liberian situation except as it affects the interests of its leaders and elites.

- High-Degree of Compliance, Likely Resolved.

Democratic Non-Military Intervention:

Iraq – Ultimately dropped territorial claims over Kuwait.

Kuwait – Disputed status not relevant.

US – Explicit peace guarantees to Kuwait.

- High Degree of Compliance, Resolved.¹

Non-Democratic Non-Military Intervention:

Armenia – Gradually accepted the OSCE principles of three-parties and the outlines for final status issues.

Azerbaijan – Has gradually accepted OSCE proposals for territory and refugee exchanges.

Russia – Has operated within a flexible framework in a support capacity with France and the US through the OSCE following its brokerage of a unilateral cease-fire in 1994.

- High Degree of compliance, likely to be resolved soon.

¹ This situation was resolved prior to the Gulf War. However, the sanctions regime helped continue to prevent Iraq from developing the capacity to resume the dispute. Following the 2003 invasion it appears increasingly unlikely that this dispute will resurface while the Iraq-US relationship remains cordial.

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